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In the Supretne Court
of the State of Utah
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N·A., a corporation, as Executor of
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMIRIS, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
IPHIGENIA P. DEMIRIS,
Defendant and Respondent,
MARGARETA DEMIRIS PAPACASTAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMIRIS, ATHANASIOS DEMIR IS,
PETER DEMIRIS and JOHN DEMIRIS,
Intervenors and Appellants.

Case No.
8982

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is taken by the plaintiff and appellant,
First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., a corporation, as executor of the estate of James C. Demiris, Deceased, and
by the intervenors and appellants, the brothers and sister
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of James C. Demiris from a judgment entered against
them and in favor of this defendant and respondent, Iphigenia Demiris, surviving widow of James C. Demiris. The
action was tried without a jury before the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court.
The appellants' brief contains an Introduction and a
Statement of Facts and we will set forth herein the facts
with which the defendant agrees, the facts recited by appellants with which she takes issue and other facts not
referred to by appellants in their brief.
It is agreed that appellants went to trial in September,
1958, on their third amended complaint, which contained
two causes of action. The first cause of action sought to
recover from defendant the sum of $38,404.45, which was
the amount allegedly obtained by her from four bank
accounts transferred by James C. Demiris into joint tenancy accounts with defendant on December_ 5, 1956
(R. 41) . The first cause of action further alleged that at
the time the accounts were changed on December 5, James
C. Demiris was mentally incompetent, and that defendant
exercised and perpetrated fraud and undue influence on
the said James C. Demiris (R. 42). The second cause of
action of the third amended complaint sought to recover
the sum of $82,746.74 which was the total of eight bank
accounts, including the four accounts set forth in the
first cause of action, and United States Savings Bonds
having an alleged value of $9,700.00. It was alleged that
between December 21, 1956, and prior to the death of
James C. Demiris on January 23, 1957, defendant withdrew all of the funds of the bank accounts and cashed all
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of the bonds and converted the proceeds thereof to her
own use (R. 43).
At the conclusion of the trial the court found that
three of the bank accounts .claimed by plaintiff in its first
cause of action and totalling $28,404. 45 were transferred
by James C. Demiris from his own personal funds into accounts in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship with
the defendant on December 5, 1956, and that prior to the
death of James C. Demiris on January 23, 1957, the defendant withdrew the funds from these accounts and retained possession of them (R. 49). The court further
found that four additional bank accounts and the United
States Savings Bonds set forth in the second cause of action
were held by the decedent and the defendant as joint tenants and that between December 21, 1956 and January 23,
1957, the defendant withdrew the funds from these accounts and cashed the bonds and retained the funds in
her possession ( R. 49) .
The court further found that between November 28,
1956 and December 15, 1956, the decedent visited with
friends on several occasions and that on such occasions he
conversed normally and intelligently and there was nothing unusual about his conduct; that prior to December
11, 1956, he was able to remember the natural objects of
his bounty and to recall to mind his property and dispose
of it according to a plan formed in his mind; that on
December 5, 1956, when the accounts claimed in plaintiff's
first cause of action were transferred to joint tenancy the
decedent, James C. Demiris, was legally competent, that he
did not lack testamentary capacity and was not acting
under any undue influence and that the transfers of accounts by said decedent on December 5, 1956, were trans-
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actions in the nature of gifts in .contemplation of death;
that prior to December 15, 1956, the decedent was capable
of conducting his own business affairs and that at no time
was the defendant a confidential adviser of the decedent
and that the withdrawal of the funds by the defendant and
the cashing of the bonds during the lifetime of the deceased
did not cause a severance of the joint tenancy (R. 50-51).

It is agreed that James C. Demiris emigrated from
Greece to America in 1902, and that two of his brothers,
John and Peter, came to America in 1906 and 1907, respectively (R. 187). The other two brothers, Gus and
Tom and the sister, Margaret, remained in Greece and
Margaret, one of the intervenors, had died prior to the
time of trial (R. 187). In 1925 James C. Demiris returned
to Greece and married the defendant, Iphigenia. The
appellants, in their statement of facts, state that while
defendant and decedent were married some 31 years, the
defendant went to Greece in 1928 and again in 1935, and
they were separated approximately 13 years of this time
(App. Br. 5). It should be noted, however, with respect
to defendant's trips to Greece, that the defendant testified
that she visited relatives in Greece in 1929 and came back
in 1930 (R. 71) and returned to visit her sick mother in
1936, was told by her husband to stay for a little while,
and before she could return, the outbreak of World War
II prevented her return until 1946 (R. 123) making a
combined absence of eleven years. She testified that while
she was in Greece her husband wrote her letters and sent
her about $5,000.00 for her living expenses.
With respect to the relationship between the defendant and Jim, the defendant testified that during the time
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Jim owned the Pacific Hotel the defendant worked in the
hotel making beds and rooms for about three or four years
(R. 124) ; that she and her husband got along just like
any other couples, sometimes quarreling and sometimes
making up, and the quarrels would last sometimes from
15 to 30 minutes (R. 73); that many of the quarrels resulted when Jim refused to go with her to visit his brothers,
and Jim would tell her she could go visit his brothers alone,
but that he would not go (R. 74-75). The defendant
denied that she was ever offered $10,000.00 if she would
divorce Jim (R. 76) and Mr. Callister, himself, did not
remember whether the offer was ever communicated to
Mrs. Demiris (R. 172).
Appellants contend that a close relationship existed
between Jim and his brothers, John and Peter, in support
of their position that Jim intended to provide generously
for them in his wills, drawn on March 19, 25, and 26, 1952
(App. Br. 4, 5, 6). They significantly failed, however, to
mention the previous will, Exhibit D-7, dated December
30, 1947, wherein the decedent left $1000.00 each to his
two brothers and one sister in Greece, but left nothing at
all for his brothers John and Peter, notwithstanding their
forty-odd years of business association. The entire residue
of his estate in the 1947 will was to go to the defendant.
In connection with the execution of the wills in 1952, it
should be noted that Mr. Callister testified that these wills
were made at a time when Jim and the defendant were
contemplating a trip to Greece and Jim was afraid that
if defendant's relatives were named as beneficiaries in the
will, they might poison him when he got to Greece.
Appellants contend that after Jim and defendant
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returned from their trip to Greece in 1952, their quarreling and marital troubles continued and cite the testimony
of six of their witnesses to support their position. It should
be noted, however, with respect to the testimony of one
tenant who .called the police on the occasion of a quarrel,
that the incident happened about eight years ago and that
the tenant who called the police had recently moved into
the apartment and was not acquainted with the decedent
and the defendant, but later became their good friend
(R. 355). John Condas saw Jim in the summer, not late
summer, of 1956, and nothing was said about Jim's wife
except that she ((Kind of hammered the thing, to go back
to Europe" (R. 183). John Pragastis, who had discussed
marital troubles with Jim, admitted on cross-examination
that he, himself, was having troubles with his wife and
would talk about his troubles to Jim (R. 212); John's wife
had just returned from a trip to Greece that summer (R.
208). The testimony of Ted Jouflas (App. Br. 7) should
include his statement that in the conversation on the corner of 3rd South and Main Street, the defendant was asking Jim to go on a trip or something (R. 228).
Respondent presents the following summary of additional testimony of witnesses referred to in appellants,.
brief:
Alke Diamant, upon cross-examination, admitted
that he had previously told counsel for the defendant that
he could not remember what the decedent had said relative
to the provisions in the will, and that the decedent said he
wanted to change the will but didn't tell how; that the last
time Alke saw the decedent was the last part of October
or early November. The decedent told Alke that he had
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several bank accounts and most of them were in joint
names with his wife (R. 222-223). Commencing on line
seven (R. 224) Mr. Diamant answered questions as
follows:
Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Swan and me
that he told you he had several bank accounts
and most of them were in joint names with his
wife?
A Correct, that was true. That is absolutely correct. I think he said he had, because I remember
one conversation when he made that statement.

I says, HWell, Jim, if you have a desire to leave
anything to your brothers and sister you have to
be careful not to have all your accounts jointly."
And I think he said that, (ti have two or three
accounts. They are in my name." And also that
he was entitled to som·e money from the sale of the
Oakwood.
But Jim was a peculiar duck. He wouldn't
tell me. I guess he didn't want me to know how
much money he was worth. But I had a fairly good
idea the way he spoke, how much the man was
worth.
Mr. Floyd R. Long, account clerk in the Trust Department for First Security Bank, Fourth South Branch,
testified that he first met Jim in 1946 and took care of
managing the Oakwood apartments for him (R. 320);
that Jim would come in once or twice a month and that
after Jim sold the Oakwood apartments the bank made
collections of the note from Elmer Butler and dispersed
the payments 264/400 to James Demiris and 63/400 each
to Peter and John Demiris (R. 321); that the Elmer Butler note, the abstract of the property, and the mortgage
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release had been in possession of the bank for collection
and handling for about five years and since the bank began
handling the collections, James Demiris would come into
the office two or three times a month, and if the payment
happened to be late he would be in more often (R. 322).
On December 10, 1956, Mr. and 11rs. Demiris came into
the bank and came up to the teller's window and Mr. Long
gave the following account of the conversation: (R. 323)

Q And who spoke to you first?
A Mr. Demiris.
Q And what did he say?
A Well, I don't recall the exact words. He started
saying that he wanted to put his wife's name on
the remittance, on his check that we mailed out
to him.

Q Did he say anything else?
A He said he would like her to be able to cash the
check, in case he was sick or something she
could ·Cash it and have some money.

Q Did he say anything else?
A He asked me what would have to be done to be
able to put her name on it, and I told him he
would have to give us a memorandum signed by
both of them, and after that I drew this memorandum up and had them both sign it.
Mr. Long said the very first approach was made by Jim
before any conversation took place between Jim and the
Defendant (R. 324 and R. 330). The memorandum prepared by Mr. Long was Exhibit D-20 which Mr. Demiris
picked up first and started reading and then signed without hesitation (R. 325). There was nothing unusual or
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different about Jim's appearance on this occasion than on
previous occasions. The wording on Exhibit D-20 ccJames
Demir is or I phigenia Demiris" was the terminology of Mr.
Long to enable defendant to cash the check alone since
Jim said he wanted her to be able to cash the check alone
(R. 325). Mr. Long identified Exhibit D-21 which was
a stub portion of a check which the bank had made to
James Demiris or I phigenia Demiris in the sum of $340.44
pursuant to the instructions in Exhibit D-20. Mr. Long
said he was in the presence of Jim and the defendant about
20 or 30 minutes on December lOth, and from the time
they first approached until the time they signed and left
he noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris (R. 327);
and in response to questions put to him by the Court, Mr.
Long said that there was nothing unusual about the entire
transaction (R. 3 31).
Mr. Ebenezer John Kirkham testified that he is an
insurance salesman who first met Jim in 1922; that on
about the lOth or 12th of December he met Jim and his
wife near the New Grand Hotel on 4th South Street; that
he spent five or ten minutes just passing the time of day
with them (R. 3 3 3) and noticed nothing unusual about
him and in fact was much surprised when he learned of
his death (R. 334).
Mrs. Bombas testified that she had been friends of
James Demiris and his wife for about seven or eight years,
and that Mr. and Mrs. Demiris would visit at her house
every two or three weeks ( R. 3 37) ; that the last time Mr.
and Mrs. Demiris were at her house on December 4th or
5th, they stayed about three or four hours during which
time they talked and Mrs. Bombas noticed nothing un-
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usual about Mr. Demiris (R. 339). On about December
11th or 12th she was at Mr. Demitis' house and stayed a
couple of hours; that her husband was with her and they
talked in Greek about general subjects (R. 3 38) and the
witness noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris; that
Jim talked nice and seemed happy (R. 343).
Mrs. Tiano, a housewife and an employee of Utah
Woolen Mills said she was a good friend of Mr. and Mrs.
Demiris and met them about eight years ago (R. 345).
During a period of about a year before Jim's death they
would stop and visit Mr. and Mrs. Demiris two or three
times a month. She and her husband saw Mr. and Mrs.
Demiris three times between the :first of December and the
13th (R. 345). The visits between December 1st and 13th
were about an hour each, and on these occasions Mr. and
Mrs. Demiris were present and participated in the conversation. On the morning of December 13th, she and
her husband were leaving for California and went to say
good-bye to Mr. and Mrs. Demiris, and while talking
about a vacation Mr. Demiris said, uMaybe I will make a
trip to California one of these days," and the witness
noticed nothing unusual about his conversation (R. 346).
Mrs. O'Connell testified that she and her husband
have resided at the Oakwood apartments for the past 15
years, and during that time they were well acquainted with
James Demiris (R. 349). She visited with Mr. Demiris
frequently (R. 349). During the month of November,
1956, she visited with him on several occasions and sometimes the visits were one-half to three-quarters of an hour,
and he seemed to enjoy conversing with her (R. 350}.
Between December 1st and 15th she saw him practically
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every day and would visit with him for a few minutes. He
told her his feet bothered him, to which she answered that
he was walking too much (R. 3 51) ; then he told the
witness he couldn't read so much any more because his
eyes bothered him and he either said he had or would go
to an eye doctor (R. 352). Mrs. O'Connell noticed nothing unusual about any of the conversations with Mr. Demiris before he went to the hospital except that towards the
last he appeared sick ( R. 3 52) ; she said that James always
recognized her (R. 3 52). On cross-examination, Mrs.
O'Connell said she remembered telling Mr. Fullmer that
she did not notice any difference in the latter portion of
Mr. Demiris' life until he got sick, and then he just seemed
to kind of give up (R. 3 55).
Mrs. Helen Tsimpoukis testified that she is a widow
who now works for Pike's Manufacturing (R. 356); that
she had known James Demiris since 1921 and his wife
since 1926, and had visited with them frequently ever
since the Demirises were married; that most of the visits
were in her house because her husband, while he was living, didn't like to go visit in the hotel (R. 357); that in
December 1956, she saw Mr. Demiris several times (R.
357). On December 7th, a Friday night, Mr. and Mrs.
Demiris came while she was doing house cleaning and
stayed about 45 minutes and seemed to be very happy, and
when she asked why they were happy they said, ((He went
to the bank and changed the books." (R. 358); that on
this occasion they talked at length and had coffee and refreshments and she noticed nothing different about Jim
on that visit of December 7th. About a week later, possibly December 12th or 13th, they came at night and
stayed quite long, maybe a couple of hours. Mr. and Mrs.
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Demiris visited with her as usual, but after a couple of
hours Mr. Demiris said he felt tired and wanted to go
home, but she didn't notice anything unusual or wrong
with him other than he mentioned he was tired and
wanted to go home (R. 359). On December 19th or 20th,
since Jim and his wife had not come to visit her, she went
over to Jim's apartment and found Jim sick in bed and
Virginia was worried (R. 3 60). It was on this occasion
that he told her there was a .crowd of people outside the
window (R. 3 61) and he refused to eat. On cross-examination Mrs. Tsimpoukis said in her opinion Jim and his
wife got along all right; even though they had fights, they
would be all right again after a few minutes (R. 363);
that Jim would talk to people he liked to talk to and if
he didn't like the person he would not talk (R. 3 65) ; that
no one could get any money out of Jim if he didn't want
them to have it (R. 375); that because Jim never gave
his wife very much while they were married, she thought
his wife should be entitled to all of the money (R. 376).
Mrs. Georgia Demas, age 67, was in ill health at the
time of the trial, and her deposition was published in part.
She said she is a widow who lives at the Oakwood apartments; that she had known James Demiris for over 30
years· (R. 379) and that she came to live in the Oakwood
apartments in 1956 (R. 380). For two months before
Jim went to the hospital she had a chance to see him and
talked to him many times since he lived in the apartment
next door (R. 381) , and they talked in Greek all of the
time. She had talked with him during the period of about
a week before he went to see Doctor Powell, and she
noticed nothing wrong before he went to the Doctor
(R. 383); but after he had gone to Dr. Powell he appeared
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quite sick (R. 385). Jim never wanted to go visit his
brothers, although Mrs. Demiris would try to get him to
go for such visits (R. 386). One day she remembered Jim
and his wife going up town and the next day Jim talked
wi-th her at length and said ((Mrs. Demas, I've drawn my
books and the money to my wife" (R. 387). During this
long visit she noticed nothing wrong or unusual about him
(R. 388).
Miss Helen Demiris, daughter of Peter Demiris (R.
407) said that on November 25th, 1956, she found out for
the :first time that Jim had made a will and his will had
mentioned the brothers and one sister (R. 410) . She relayed this information to her father and possibly her Uncle
John ( R. 411 ) .
Mrs. Olympia Demiris, wife of Peter Demiris testified that she had heard of James's will on November 25th
( R. 415) , but admitted that when her deposition was
taken several months before, she denied that she ever heard
about the will; but at the time of trial she said she meant
to say that she had never heard about the will from Jim
(R. 416), even though the specific questions were as
follows:
HQ Did Jim ever talk to you about his Will?"
A To me,. no. James, no.
Q HQ Did you know that he had a will?"
A From him, no. From Jim, never.
Q ttQ You never heard about the will?"
A I heard from Mrs. Tsimpoukis only.
Q You didn't say that at the time, did you?
A Well, there was too many gentlemen. I guess
it slipped my mind, but I meant about Mrs.
Tsimpoukis.
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Q Let me read you the answer you gave at that
time, and you tell me whether or not that is
what you said.
uQ Did Jim ever talk to you about his will?
uA No.
uQ Did you know that he had a will?
uA No.
uQ You never heard about the will?
uA No."
MEDICAL TESTIMONY
Dr. Adelai E. Callaghan testified that he is a licensed
physician of the State of Utah with an M.D. Degree from
the University of Maryland, and his speciality is in the
:field of eye, ear, nose and throat, and he has been engaged
in practice since 1934 (R. 274); that on November 28,
1956, he examined James Demiris; that an office assistant
obtained a history and then the doctor proceeded with an
examination in which he found Jim was suffering from
cataracts and his vision was reduced rather sharply, but
could be improved with new glasses (R. 27 6) ; that his
vision was 20/50 in either eye and constituted a considerable handicap in connection with gett~ng about the town
and traversing streets in traffic (R. 277) ; that Mrs. Demiris accompanied Jim at the examination and that as
routine procedure he advised that it was not safe for Jim
to be traveling alone (R. 277); that Jim was instructed to
return three days later, on November 30th, which he did
and his prescription was checked while wearing the correction (R. 278) . That the entire examination requires a
minimum of one hour and a quarter, and the doctor was
personally with the patient for approximately 45 minutes.
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In the .course of the examination he asked the patient to
make choices in connection with his ability to see certain
things, dilated the pupils so the eyes could be examined,
and then completed the examination with trial frame
lenses (R. 278); during the course of the examination he
asked the patient many times what he was able to see and
with which lense he could s·ee better. It would take
about 25 minutes in this question and answer procedure.
During this entire time the response of James Demiris was
normal and there was nothing unusual about his responses
(R. 279).
Doctor Phillip Murray Howard testified that he is
licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah and on
De.cember 1st he examined James Demiris (R. 163). The
doctor said the complaints were such that he could not
quite make heads or tails of why he was there, but concluded it was for a general physical examination, since he
had some complaint of leg pains resulting from the long
walks (R. 164) . The doctor said he made a superficial
examination and concluded from the external examination
that Mr. Demiris was physically normal. He made no investigation or examination of his mental capacity (R.
165). The doctor said that Jim was rather dull mentally
and did not appear to answer or comprehend questions
(R. 165) yet in answer to a question from the Court,
stated Mr. Demiris communicated in the English language
very adequately (R. 166). It is noted here that Dr. Howard had never seen Jim Demiris before this day, and was
Helen Demiris' doctor (R. 306). On cross-examination
Dr. Howard said Mr. Demiris appeared to him to be rational (R. 166). The doctor also said he noted on his card
that the forgetfulness mentioned was probably secondary
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to cerebral arteriosclerosis, but that he did not prescribe
any treatment, did not suggest Mr. Demiris return to him
at a later date, and did not refer him to anyone else for
treatment (R. 165).
Dr. George Diumenti testified that he is a licensed
physician and surgeon of the State of Utah and has practiced since 1940 at Bountiful, Utah, (R. 282). On December 14, 19 56, James Demiris came to his office with his
wife and a brother. The chief complaint was forgetfulness which was given either by the wife or the brother
(R. 2 8 3 ) . The doctor excluded the wife and brother from
the room and continued the examination of the patient.
Jim was responsive to the questions. The patient was given
a complete general physical examination and the findings
were negative (R. 284-285). However, since the chief
complaint was forgetfulness the doctor felt he should refer
the patient to a specialist to rule out any skull injury, brain
tumor, or arteriosclerosis. The doctor discussed this referral with Jim and remembers definitely having asked
Jim if he was able to take care of the medical expense or
that if he didn't have the finances, the doctor would send
him to the County Hospital; and Jim responded that he
was financially able to take care of himself (R. 29 5) . Jim
was then referred to Dr. Powell. The next time the doctor
saw Jim was at the hospital a day or two after his admission, at which time the doctor was greatly surprised and
impressed with his very severe deterioration (R. 290). At
the hospital Jim didn't recognize the doctor and didn't
seem to answer or want to answer the questions.
Dr. Chester B. Powell testified that he is a specialist
in the practice of neuro-surgery (R. 125). The doctor
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could not remember any specific history given to him by
the wife except that she was greatly concerned and hoped
that the doctor would do something for him (R. 129);
that Jim had a severe loss of appetite which particularly
concerned Mrs. Demiris (R. 130). The doctor was unable
during the lifetime of Jim Demiris to determine whether
he was suffering from acute senile degeneration or from
cerebral arteriosclerosis (R. 13 3) . and did not distinguish
the cause until after receiving the results of the autopsy (R.
13 5). The doctor, in stating the characteristics of persons
suffering from senile-dementia, stated (R. 13 8):
ttThese individuals' behavior is changed and
their personality. They lose some of the characteristics that people knew them by, their sense of
humor, some of their ways, although to some extent they tend to exaggerate their pre-existing
personality. An individual who guarded his money
might become extremely concerned about it. An
individual that looked out for himself and didn't
take anybody's advice might become very suspicious of other people and feel that everyone was
out to do him out of something."
The doctor said he had considerable difficulty in discussing his findings with Mrs. Demiris. He said Mrs. Demiris
was in a state of severe and constant emotional tension,
was quite distraught and that the doctor had great difficulty in communicating any of the facts ·COncerning her
husband's condition to her or trying to explain to her what
they meant (R. 140). Additional tests were made on
December 19th which indicated there was no tumor or
growth. In the letter to Dr. Diumenti, dated December
20, 1956, Exhibit D-9, following the examination of De-
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cember 18th, Dr. Powell, in reviewing the matter, stated
in part as follows:
uon examination Mr. Demiris shows a slow
cerebration and ready confusion of a senile person,
although his speech and his initial responses seem
appropriate enough. He is neurologically negative
except for this change.
Dr. Powell sent a supplementary note December 22, 1956,
in which he stated as follows:
uMr. James Demiris
Mr. Demiris was rechecked at home December
21. Since the 18th he had become increasingly confused and refused to take any food or fluid or medications. There was no change on examination except for complete confusion and total disorientation. It was impossible to communicate with him or
to obtain any type of cooperation.

It is evident the deterioration is progressing
very rapidly. The patient will clearly require institutional care and constant attention.
His wife presents an additional problem since
she is intensely neurotic herself and has both language and intellectual deficits which make it impossible to communicate any understanding of his
condition to her. Hospitalization in a closed ward
is recommended and pneumoencephalogram
would be a wise precaution to rule out a frontal
hematoma or other mass lesion despite the negative
EEG. Then some means of permanent institutionalization will have to be arranged for."
On voir dire, Dr. Powell admitted that if he had obtained a history of the circumstances connected with the
transaction with Mr. Long at the bank and the conversa-
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tions with the other witnesses, that all of these facts, if
reliable would certainly alter his opinion (R. 148-149).
On cross-examination Dr. Powell said it was not unusual
for people 74 years of age to exhibit some of the symptoms
he described and still be competent to carry on ordinary
activities; that these symptoms may come on gradually
and while the patient may have some of these symptoms
he is still able to engage in normal activities; that in either
senile changes or cerebral vascular diseases it is possible for
changes to occur quite rapidly, over night, and that in
fact the doctor had noticed a very rapid deterioration in
Mr. Demiris from December 18th to the 21st (R. 15 5).
Dr. Powell acknowledged that the best evidence concerning the competency of Mr. Demiris and the rate of
deterioration would lie in observations of his mental and
physical activities by others in a period in which the deterioration occurred; and this does not necessarily require
medical observation but could be observation by those
living with him or associating with him and those with
whom he did business (R. 155-156).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS WAS COMPETENT TO MAKE GIFTS AND TRANSFERS IN
CONTEMPLATIO,N OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 5,
1956, AND DECEMBER 10, 1956, IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE UNDUE
INFLUENCE OR DOMINATE HER HUSBAND IN
THE CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE MONEY IN
THE BANK ACCOUNTS AND THE U.S. SAVINGS
BONDS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENTS
AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE
CAUSE.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF JOINT TENANCY CREATED
BY THE AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES IN ESTABLISHING THE JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.
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POINT V
THE TWO DEPOSIT CARDS IN THE CONTINENTAL BANK CREATED A JOINT TENANCY
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT·
POINT VI
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE WITHDRAWALS BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE DECEDENT DID NOT
TERMINATE THE JOINT TENANCY IS SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS WAS COMPETENT TO MAKE GIFTS AND TRANSFERS IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 5,
1956, AND DECEMBER 10, 1956, IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The test of mental capacity in ·Cases of transfers in
contemplation of death is the same test applied in determining testamentary capacity. Burgess vs. COlby 93
Utah 103, 71 P.2d 185, stated the test to be as stated in
In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P.2d 1103, as
follows:
((The true test is as to whether the testatrix
had (sufficient mind and memory (at the time of
making the Will) to remember who were the
natural objects of her bounty, recall to mind her
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property, and dispose of it understandingly according to some plan formed in her mind'."
In an equity review of facts, if the records shows a
fair preponderance, or even if the evidence is balanced
evenly, the trial court's :findings should be sustained.
Randall vs. Tracy-Collins Trust Company 6 Utah 2d 18,
305 P.2d 480.
In applying the foregoing test of mental capacity
to the instant case we review :first the evidence presented
by the plaintiff relative thereto. The lay witnesses of the
Plaintiff who testified ·Concerning mental capacity, were
John Demiris, Peter Demiris and Olympia Demiris, his
wife, and Mrs. Milligan, who collected rent at the Oakwood apartments. John Demiris testified that in September, 1956, Jim didn't remember some names, and if someone asked him how he was getting along he would reply
ni am all right, I got plenty of money" (R 253-254};
that John would see Jim downtown walking on the street
about every day (R. 255}, and the next incident he
remembered was on November 9, 1956, when John saw
Jim on main street at the stock exchange, where Jim used
to go often, and John suggested they send $30.00 to a
sick sister in Greece, whereupon they went to the Continental Bank, made out a check and went to the Post
Office. John asked Jim to write a few words to the
sister and when Jim said he didn't know what to write
her, John suggested a few words, whereupon James
wrote a short note which they both signed and mailed
with the check (R. 256-257}. Although John saw Jim
almost every day in November, John could not remember any other incidents in November except that on November 26th he met Jim down town and Jim complained
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that he was tired and his feet were bothering him; that
Jim looked at his watch and said he had a date with the
woman he married, whereupon John urged Jim, against
his will, to go up to the office of Dr. Walker to get an
appointment to see why Jim was losing his memory (R.
258). It is to be noted that Novem.ber 26, 1956, was a
Monday, and according to the testimony of Helen Demiris they first found out about the will on Sunday,
November 25th, (R. 410), and that she told her father
the following day (R. 411). It may be just coincidence
that John would see his brother downtown every day in
November and would note an unusual circumstance in
connection with his memory on November 26th, the day
he found out about Jim's will. The next time John saw
Jim was at Jim's apartment November 27th, at which
time John told the defendant she should take Jim to a
doctor as soon as possible because he doesn't remember;
that on this same day John didn't remember talking very
much to Jim, but Jim tried on John's shoes but found
them no better than his own (R. 261). The next day
mentioned by John was November 29th when John
visited at the apartment and Jim said he couldn't see
any better with the glasses (R. 261). Jim wouldn't talk
very much with John on this day, November 29th (R.
262). On December 1st, John, with a nephew and a
niece, Helen Demiris, took Jim and the defendant to see
Dr. Howard, Helen's doctor; but John did not notice
anything unusual on that day. (R. 263). On December
2nd, John and a nephew took Jim and the defendant for
a ride out towards Murray where Jim was supposed to
have said that he had never seen Murray before, (R. 263),
and after the drive they went to Peter's house where Jim
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had some coffee but said he didn't want any milk; that
at Peter's house Jim seemed very restless and nervous,
kept looking at his watch and wanted to leave and was
taken home (R. 265). On December 3rd, John saw Jim
and defendant downtown where John again urged that
Jim must be taken to a doctor, but he reported nothing
else as a result of this meeting (R. 265). On December
4th John went to Jim's apartment for a visit but Jim
would not talk to him very much (R. 266). On December
5th or 6th, John went to the apartment but was told that
Jim and the defendant were downtown so he waited
until their return, but Jim wouldn't talk to him (R. 266).
On December 14th, John and a nephew drove Jim and
the defendant out to see Dr. Diumenti, and on the way to
Bountiful Jim said he had never seen the Standard Oil
Company before and as he rode along he was reading the
signs but never said a word (R. 268-269).
It is submitted that the foregoing summary of the
testimony of John Demiris, if believed, only indicates
isolated instances of forgetfulness on November 9th and
November 26th, and indicates that after John tried to
take Jim to the doctor on November 26th that thereafter
Jim was reluctant to talk with John.
Peter Demiris testified that in September Jim couldn't
remember some old railroad acquaintances (R. 196),
then on December 2nd, the day John, Pete, James, defendant Virginia and a nephew went for a ride through Murray
to Midvale, Pete asked Jim when they reached Murray if
he knew what town it was and Jim said ccNo"; and that
Jim wouldn't talk very much with them the rest of that
day (R. 197-198).
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Olympia Demiris testified that she saw Jim on October 26th on his name day at his home, and the only
words she heard him say the whole evening was ((No"
(R. 234) ; then in the middle of November she saw Jim
on the corner of Anderson Jewelry Company and she
stopped and asked him what he was doing there and he
said he was waiting for someone, and when she suggested
whether it was his wife he was waiting for, he replied,
HI think so." The next time she observed him was December 2nd at her home, and when Jim called Peter ((The
Countryman" and John stated, ttthis is your brother"
Olympia said that Jim ((He just laugh all the time. He
laughed." (R. 238). On cross-examination Olympia said
she didn't know whether Jim recognized her on the street
during the middle of November, and that she herself was
in too big a hurry to talk to him very much ( R. 2 39) .
She stated that Jim did not come to her place during the
month of November, although when she called them to
come for dinner on Thanksgiving Day he answered the
phone and after saying hello, did not talk any more with
her and just called his wife to the phone (R. 240) .
Mrs. Milligan who collected rents at Oakwood apartment said she had a dispute with Jim over a rental payment in September or October of 1956, and that thereafter Jim would walk by her without even recognizing
her (R. 244) , and in response to a question by the Court,
she acknowledged that Jim may have been ignoring her
because of the rental incident (R. 245) .
The medical testimony of the plaintiffs' was given by
Dr. Howard and Dr. Powell. Dr. Howard said he examined Jim on December 1st, and obtained ua history in
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an odd sort of way," but in the confusion ((couldn't make
head or tail of why he was there," but did remember
some complaint of leg pains resulting from the long walks
(R. 164). Dr. Howard said that Jim was rather dull
mentally, but when asked by the Court if this could be
due to lack of understanding of English, the doctor said
uNo, Mr. Demiris communicated in the English language
very adequately." (R. 166). It is submitted that since
this was the first time Dr. Howard had ever seen James
Demiris, for him to conclude the man was dull mentally
and not responsive and yet to determine at the ~arne time
that he could communicate in the English language very
adequately, seems to be inconsistent. The doctor testified
that he made a superficial physical examination and found
nothing abnormal, and made no investigation or examination of his mental capacity (R. 165). The doctor admitted on cross-examination that though he noted forgetfulness in his file and concluded that it was probably
secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis, he did not prescribe
any treatment, did not suggest that Mr. Demiris return
at a later date, and did not refer him to any one else for
treatment (R. 166). That Mr. Demiris appeared to him
to be rational (R. 166) .
The testimony of Dr. Powell has been given in length
both in the appellants' brief and in the Statement of Facts
herein (supra p. 17). Dr. Powell saw the decedent on
December 18th, and could only speculate as to his condition prior to that time. Doctor noted that between the
18th and the 21st of December Jim's condition progressed
very rapidly, and the entire condition could have occurred within a period of a few days (R. 15 5) . The
doctor admitted that the best evidence as to when the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

terioration occurred would be the observation of persons
during the period of deterioration. (R. 15 6). This observation could be by those living with him, or closely associated with him and those with whom he did business (R.
156). The doctor stated that if he had known about the
transaction with Mr. Long on December lOth and some
of the visits with other persons between December 1st
and 15th (R. 148) that these facts would alter his opinion
(R. 149). The doctor stated that persons suffering from
this senile type of deterioration tend to exaggerate their
pre-existing personality, and that a individual who guarded
his money might become extremely concerned about it,
and an individual that looked out for himself and didn't
take anybody's advice might become very suspicious of
other people and feel that everyone was out to do him out
of something (R. 13 8) .
From all of the foregoing evidence submitted by
the plaintiffs, none of the testimony of the lay witnesses
indicated that on December 5th and December lOth, 1956,
James Demiris could not recall the natural objects of his
bounty and recall to mind his property and dispose of it
understandingly according to some plan formed in his
mind. The medical testimony of Dr. Howard indicated
that he had no serious concern for the condition of Mr.
Demiris in that he deemed him rational, prescribed nothing, and made no referral. Dr. Powell while indicating
there could have been some symptoms of deterioration
existing from one to four months prior to December 18th,
1956, admitted that it is entirely possible that the deterioration could be very rapid; that the deterioration in
fact was very rapid between December 18 and December
21, 1956; that the best evidence of his condition prior
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thereto would be from persons who observed him, and
that a person could have some symptoms of the senile
disease and still be able to engage in normal activities (R.
154).
The defendant presented several witnesses who had
observed James Demiris between November 28th and
December 15, 1956. Dr. Callaghan, an eye, ear, nose and
throat spe.cialist testified that during an eye examination
on November 28, 1956, which required a total of one and
a quarter hours, during which time the doctor spent at
least 25 minutes in question and answer, trial of lenses,
etc., and he found Jim to be very responsive and normal.
Mr. Floyd R. Long, a bank clerk at First Security
Bank who had known James Demiris over the past ten
years, and saw him at least twice a month, said that on
December 1Oth James Demiris gave him instructions
relative to putting his wife's name on the remittance from
Elmer Butler because he would like her to be able to cash
the check in case he was sick or something, she could
cash it and have some money (R. 323). That the first
approach was made by Mr. Demiris and he gave all of the
instructions before any conversation took place between
Mr. Demiris and his wife; that a memorandum, Exhibit
D-20, was prepared by Long and was read by James
Demiris and signed by James Demiris and his wife; that
during the entire transaction, which took 20 or 30 minutes,
Mr. Long noticed nothing unusual in any respect about
the en tire transaction, his appearance, or in any other
manner (R. 325).
Mr. Kirkham, an insurance salesman, who had known
James Demiris since 1922, said he saw Mr. and Mrs. De-
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miris on 4th South on December lOth or 12th and stopped
to pass the time of day with them for :five or ten minutes,
and had an occasion to observe them both. He noticed
nothing different in any way from his previous meeting
with Jim (R. 3 3 3). There was nothing unusual about his
responses, and in fact Mr. Kirkham was later very much
surprised to learn of his death. (R. 3 34).
Mrs. Bombas, who had been a friend of Mr. and Mrs.
James Demiris for about eight years and had visited with
both of them about twice a month over that period of
time, both in her home and in their home, stated that she
had visited with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris at her home on
December 4th or 5th, on which occasion they stayed three
or four hours and conversed generally about many subjects
using the Greek language, and she noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris on that occasion (R. 339); that
on December 11th or 12th, Mrs. Bomb as and her husband
visited Mr. and Mrs. Demiris at the Demiris apartment for
about two hours, and they talked about making Christmas
cookies and about other matters; that Mr. Demiris participated in the conversation in the Greek language with
Mrs. Bombas and her husband and during this entire visit
she noticed nothing unusual (R. 3 38) .
Mrs. Ann Tiano saw Jim about three times between
December 1st and the 13th, and on the 13th of December
she talked briefly with Jim about her trip to California
and noticed nothing unusual about his conversation at
that time (R. 346).
Mrs. O'Connell had lived at the Oakwood apartments
several years and visited with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris almost
daily throughout that period. She said she had conversa-
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tions almost daily with Mr. Demiris during the month of
December before he went to the hospital. She stated that
he appeared to her to be sick a couple or three weeks before he went to the hospital, and that he complained of his
feet and his eyes (R. 3 52). That towards the last, although
he appeared to be sick, he always recognized her (R. 352).
That she didn't notice anything different about him when
she talked to him, except that he looked ill (R. 3 54) .
Mrs. Tsimpoukis who had been very close friends with
Mr. and Mrs. James Demiris since 1926, and who had
visited with them several times a week over the period of
their association, remembered a specific visit on the Friday
night, December 7th, while she was house cleaning, when
Mr. and Mrs. Demiris came together for a visit and stayed
for about 45 minutes. They appeared very happy and
stated that he had gone to the bank and changed the
books. They talked at length and she noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris on this date of December 7th.
(R. 358). She visited again with them at her home on
December 12th or 13th when they stayed about two hours,
had refreshments and talked about a number of subjects;
and she noticed nothing unusual about Mr. Demiris, except
that he stated that he would like to leave after about two
hours visit because he was tired (R. 359).
Dr. Diumenti gave James Demiris a general physical
examination on December 14th and while his findings were
negative, yet because he had received a complaint of forgetfulness, he referred James to Dr. Powell, a specialist,
to rule out any possibilities of brain tumor, etc. He said
that James was responsive and did not give any bad answers (R. 284), and he recalled specifically asking James
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if he had finances available to take care of additional
medical expenses, and James told him that he was financially able to take care of himself (R. 286). The doctor said he
was greatly surprised and impressed with the very severe
deterioration which he noted between the time he first
saw Mr. Demiris on December 14th and when he next
saw him one or two days after his admission to the hospital (R. 290).
From the foregoing review of the evidence it clearly
appears that the decedent James Demiris on December
5th, 1956, at the time the remainder of the savings. accounts were made into joint tenancy, and on December
1Oth when he designated his wife a joint payee of the
Elmer Butler note, had full testamentary capacity.
In the case of Burgess vs. Colby, supra, there was a suit
by some of the children of Joseph Colby to cancel a deed to
real property and an assignment of water stock executed
by Joseph Colby to his wife nine days before his death, on
the grounds of mental incapacity. The jury returned a
verdict that he did not have mental capacity, but on
appeal, this Court reversed the judgment. The Supreme
Court held that though Colby was 78 years old, became
ill, grew progressively worse, and for the last day or two
prior to his death was unconscious, and though in his
early sickness he was disturbed in mind about his property,
and several times mentioned that he wanted it fixed
proper; and on the day the instruments were signed, the
officer of the bank was unable to get Mr. Colby to sit up
or be conscious enough to sign, but later in the evening
the deeds had been signed, and though Mr. Colby at the
time of signing did not appear to be any different except
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that he was sick, this Court found and concluded that the
decedent was competent although he was a sick man,
and getting weaker day by day, having difficulty with
speech on account of having lost his teeth, and rambled
from one subject to another.
In Re Chongas Estate, 115 Utah 95, 202 P.2d 711,
where the decedent had been committed to the mental
hospital and subsequently released, changed his will, and
later died in the mental hospital after being recommitted,
he was found to have had testamentary capacity, even
though he was described by witnesses as being jumpy, not
coherent, not all there, had no mind at all, and was crazy
as a bed bug.
In final analysis the most that the plaintiff can
claim for any of its witnesses is that on a few isolated occasions James Demiris seemed forgetful and refused to
talk with his brothers, John and Pete, and his sister-inlaw, Olympia.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE
UNDUE INFLUENCE OR DOMINATE HER HUSBAND IN THE CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK
ACCOUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956.
The Appellants admit at the outset that the only evidence of undue influence in this case must be taken from
inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances, and
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the facts and circumstances discussed by appellants fall
into three general categories:
( 1) Jim had a generous attitude towards his brothers
and sister, and would not have failed to provide for them;
(2) Jim disliked his wife; and (3) that Jim's wife took
advantage of her superior position in a confidential relationship.
Considering first the attitude Jim had towards his
brothers and sister, the appellants failed to mention the
will Jim made on December 30, 1947, (D-7, R. 392). In
this will of December 30, 1947, Jim left $1,000.00 each
to his two brothers and one sister in Greece, and left nothing at all for his brothers John and Peter in Salt Lake City,
and left the entire rest, residue and remainder to his beloved wife. By December 30, 1947, Jim had already
accumulated his fortune. The appellants dwell at length
on the long lifetime association between Jim and his
brothers Peter and John, starting in 1907 in working here
together in America, and yet after this long association
with his brothers, Jim on December 30, 1947, made a will
in which he left nothing for John or Peter Demiris. This
should be a complete answer to the claim that John and
Peter Demiris were the natural objects of the bounty of
Jim Demiris. As to Jim's generosity towards his sick
sister in Greece, John testified that on November 9, 1956,
John suggested to Jim that they send some money to their
sick sister, whereupon together they sent her about $30.00
and for about seven months prior thereto they had been
sending her only about $15.00 per month (R. 256). On
cross-examination John was asked if Jim owed him any
money at the time of his death, to which John replied that
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between 1910 and 1914 he had given Jim $700.00 or
$750.00, and then gave him another $250.00, but later
when he asked Jim about it, Jim said he couldn't remember
any such deal and wouldn't pay John (R. 309-310).
Peter Demiris, after testifying that he had worked off and
on with his brother Jim, stated that when he worked as
bartender for Jim at the Pacific Hotel, he would work
16 hours a day for Jim but would only be paid for eight
hours, though this was at a time when Jim was making
most of his money (R. 192) ; but on cross-examination
Peter said he was working by the month, not by the hour,
and Jim never offered to pay him more and Peter never
asked for more (R. 200). Peter further said that Jim
didn't owe him any money, and he didn't expect anything
from Jim (R. 201).
The appellants point to the wills of March 19th and
March 26, 1952, as being conclusive proof of the lifetime desires of James Demiris, with respect to his bounty.
It is to be noted that these wills were executed at a time
when Jim was contemplating a trip to Greece (R. 169)
and he made the will of March 26, 1952, to make sure
that in the event of a common disaster, the estate would
not go to his wife's family (R. 170) , and further that he
was afraid that with his wife's relatives named as beneficiaries in the will, if he got over to Greece they would
poison him (R. 174). Jim went to Greece with his wife
in 1952, and stayed six months (R. 72).
Next, considering Jim's attitude towards his wife,
we note first the financial arrangements he made for her.
As shown by Exhibit P-22, commencing in September,
1943, and continuing through January 1947, Jim pur-
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chased about 83 separate United States Government
Bonds in denominations of $100.00 and $500.00 in the
names of Mr. James Demiris or Iphigenia Demiris, totaling
about $10,400.00. Account number 94501 in the Continental National Bank and Trust Company, Exhibit P-12,
was opened in the joint names of James Demiris or Iphigenia on February 23, 1950, with a deposit of $5,304.33,
and many subsequent deposits thereafter increased the
a.ccount to about $10,000.00 at the time of his death.
Account No. 4159, State Savings and Loan Association,
Exhibit P-15 shows an account opened December 12, 1949,
in the name of James Demiris or Iphigenia Demiris, with
an initial deposit of $750.00 in 1949, and subsequent deposits bringing the amount up to $10,000.00 in December,
1956. Then of special significance is Account No. 22256
with the First Security Bank of Utah, Exhibit P-10,
which was started originally in 1952, in the name of James
C. Demiris only, and when changed into joint account on
March 12, 1956, was $4,743.78, and the balance in
December of 1956 was $6,841.99. The account cards and
statement sheets appear as exhibits in the file.
Jim died at the age of 74, and his wife at the time of
trial was 54 years old, which would make her about 22
years younger than him. They were married in 19 2 5, in
Athens, Greece (R. 70). She went back to Greece in
1929 for one year to visit relatives and again in 1936 at
which time her return was prevented by the outbreak
of World War II, and she didn't return to the United
States until 1946 (R. 46 and 123). While she was in
Greece she corresponded with her husband regularly and
he sent her about $5,000.00 for her living expenses, as
well as having placed the United States Savings Bonds
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in her name as set forth above. Mr. and Mrs. Demiris
were together on most of their visits with friends and
relatives. Mrs. Tsimpoukis who had known Jim and his
wife since 1926, and who visited with them at least
weekly, continuing up to the time of hospitalization of
Jim, testified concerning the many visits together by Mr.
and Mrs. Demiris at her place (R. 375). Mrs. Bombas who
had known Mr. and Mrs. Demiris for about seven years
before his death, told of several visits, both at her house
and at Jim's apartment, with Mr. and Mrs. Demiris (R.
340). Mrs. Olympia Demiris testified that Jim and his
wife would come almost every Sunday to visit her (R.
232), except that in the month of November, 1956,
he did not visit her at all ( R. 2 39) . John Demiris testified
that Jim began arguing with his wife a year or two after
they got married, and the argument continued during the
remainder of their married life; that the only nice thing
he ever remembers Jim saying about his wife was uShe
is economical, and she is pretty tight" (R. 303); he said
that she was a good cook but that Jim didn't care much
for eating, and was pretty hard to satisfy and nobody
could satisfy him (R. 3 04).
It is an easy matter to describe many married couples
as ttalways quarrelling" and yet when analyzed their differences can be singular rather than multiple. So far as
the arguments at the Oakwood apartments are concerned,
the tenants testified they heard voices in Greek (R. 242).
On page 31 of the appellants' brief they cite several
pages in the transcript to support their contention that
the marriage was filled with quarrels. An analysis of all of
these references indicates that the quarrels or discussions
were relative to Jim's wife wanting him to go to Greece,
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with the exception of John Demiris, who indicated some
disputes were over money (R. 252), and Jim, being very
frugal, would spend very little. In final analysis it boils
down to a proposition that according to the witnesses
for the appellant, if his wife continued to press him to return to Greece, he would divorce her rather than go
with her to Greece. All of the testimony concerning quarrels about Greece referred to instances prior to November,
1956.
A very important change took place in the lives of
James Demiris and his wife in late November, 1956. Jim,
who had previously been in excellent health and walked
miles and miles every day, for the first time, began to
feel pain in his legs and was bothered in his eyesight. He
had never been to a doctor, and then starting on November
26, when he was taken for an appointment with Dr.
Walker by his brother John, and on November 28th and
30th when he was examined by Dr. Callaghan for his
eyes, and on December 1st when he was given a examination by Dr. Howard, the combined effects of the pain in his
legs and eyes, and visiting the two doctors within the
space of about five days, started Jim to thinking about
quickly settling his financial affairs. His wife went with
him to the eye doctor on November 28th, and following
the advice of Dr. Callaghan, she did not let Jim travel
on the streets alone there~fter (R. 277) and (R. 79).
Mrs. Demiris cancelled the appointment which John had
made with Dr. Walker, because Jim was disturbed about
this and didn't want to go to Dr. Walker but wanted to
go to Dr. Diumenti (R. 80). Jim didn't want to go to
Dr. Howard on December 1st, because he said he didn't
want to pay $5.00 for no good reason (R. 82). Jim must
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have become suspicious of Peter and John after November 26th, because he refused to talk with Peter and John
thereafter, and yet conversed very normally with the
people he wanted to talk with, such as Mrs. O'Connell,
Mrs. Tsimpoukis, Mr. and Mrs. Bombas, Mr. Kirkham,
Mr. Floyd Long, Mrs. Tiano and Mrs. Demas. His wife
testified that Jim seldom wanted to visit his brothers
and would only go after she quarreled with him to get
him to go (R. 47); and this was supported by the testimony of Mrs. Demas (R. 386). Under these circumstances, Jim awakened his wife at :five o'clock one morning on December 5th, 1956, and told her he would like
to change the books to her name, and told her to get up
and get dressed, because she took so long to dress, so that
they could go downtown and change the books into her
name (R. 179 and R. Ill). Jim gave her the savings
books on December 5th, after changing them to her
name, and told her that if something should happen to
him and should he go to the hospital, and should the
doctor say he is, going to die, that she should go and put
the books in her name only (R. 179) . The books were
given to her on December 5th when they returned home
after the books were changed (R. 18 0) . Mr. Demiris,
while he and defendant were visiting Mrs. Tsimpoukis on
December 7th, 1956, told Mrs. Tsimpoukis that he went
to the bank and changed the books (R. 3 58) . Jim also told
Mrs. Demas while he was visiting with her alone the next
day after he had changed the books: uMrs. Demas, I've
drawn my books and the money to my wife." (R. 387).
The next transaction wherein Jim transferred assets
to his wife, was on December 10, 1956, when he went with
his wife to the First Security Bank, Fourth South Branch,
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and approached Mr. Floyd R. Long, the bank clerk, and
before any conversation took place between Mr. and Mrs.
Demiris, Jim spoke first to Mr. Long saying that he
wanted to put his wife's name on the remittance, on his
check that was mailed out to him, and that he would
like her to be able to cash the check in case he was sick or
something, she could cash it and have some money; he
further asked what would have to be done to be able to
put her name on it (R. 323) and said he wanted her to
be able to cash it alone (R. 325). Mrs. Demiris did not
speak with Mr. Long because he could not understand
her (R. 324), and while Mr. and Mrs. Demiris talked together after Mr. Demiris had already told Mr. Long
what he wanted, there was no conversation before Mr.
Demiris had stated his desires (R. 330). Mr. Long then
prepared Exhibit D-20, which he laid out on the counter
and which was picked up by Mr. Demiris, who read it
and did not hesitate in signing it (R. 325). Then in answer
to questions put by the Court, Mr. Long said there was
nothing unusual about the whole transaction (R. 3 31) .
Mr. Long, as an employee in the Trust Department of First
Security Bank, the plaintiff in this action, is at least an
impartial witness so far as the defendant is concerned.
He had seen Mr. Demiris about twice a month for the
period of ten or twelve years and found him no different
from usual on this occasion than on previous occasions,
during a 20 to 30 minute conference relative to the proceeds of the Elmer Butler note. This transaction was five
days after the transfers of savings bank accounts on
December 5, 1956.
From the foregoing review, it clearly appears that
the facts and circumstances, and the inferences therefrom

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

indicate that Mr. Demiris was acting freely and of his own
desire in the transactions of December 5th and lOth, 1956.
We should now consider the effect, if any, the husband and wife relationship which existed between Jim
and the defendant has upon the question of undue influence. While generally speaking, a husband-wife relationship can be considered a confidential relationship,
yet this should be distinguished from the relationship of
confidential adviser. In this case the evidence was that
Jim Demiris was a well educated business man who could
read and write the English and Greek languages. There
was no evidence that he at any time relied upon any
advice or counsel from his wife. He was fully acquainted
with the procedure of placing bonds and savings accounts
in joint names the way he did between September, 1943,
and March 12, 1956, as set forth supra. If Jim needed
any further advice regarding joint accounts, he in fact
obtained it from Alke Diamant when Jim told Alke he
had several accounts in joint names with his wife, and Alke
replied: ((Well, Jim, if you have a desire to leave anything
to your brothers and sister, you have to be careful not to
have all your accounts jointly." (R. 224). Jim also told
Alke that he had two or three accounts in his own name,
and that he was entitled to some money from the sale
of the Oakwood apartments (R. 224). What further
independent advice did Jim Demiris require? On the
morning of December 5th, 1956, when he awakened his
wife at five o'clock in the morning and said he remembered something, he could well have remembered the advice given him by Alke Diamant to avoid the consequences
of the will of March 26, 1952. He could clearly see now
that his wife of 32 years, who was then about 52 years
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old, was standing by him and staying with him in his
illness as she had done over the years and provided for him
even though he deprived her of all the luxuries of life, that
she was the natural object of his bounty, and that his
brothers, Pete and John, in their early seventies whom he
didn't want to visit except when he casually met them on
the street, were no more the objects of his bounty than
they were on December 30, 1947, when he drew his first
will and left everything to his wife, except $1,000.00 each
to his two brothers and one sister in Greece. There was no
evidence that his wife or anyone else could make Jim
Demiris do what he didn't want to do. In statements to
Mrs. Tsimpoukis on December 7th and to Mrs. Demas on
about December 6th, that he had put the books in his
wife's name, and his statement to Mr. Floyd R. Long that
he wanted his wife to get the money from the Elmer
Butler note, all of which conversations were normal and
usual without hesitance, clearly show that Jim was acting of his own desire at the time the transfers were made.

It would be an anomaly in the law to hold that a wife,
who understood very little, if anything, about business,
who had never advised her husband in matters of business,
and who had difficulty conversing in the English language,
had a duty to advise her husband, who was well educated
and qualified in business, that he should not transfer the
balance of the account to her name without obtaining
separate counsel and advice.
The facts in this case are certainly different from the
facts in the cases cited by the appellants. In Re Swan's
Estate 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, an attorney and a
self-imposed friend drew a codicil to a will for a lady of
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subnormal intelligence who had been relying upon their
advice, and in which codicil the attorney and friend were
to receive substantially all of the estate with only a small
portion going to the sister and sole heir of the testatrix.
In the .case of Miller vs. Livingstone, 3 1 Utah 415,
88 P. 338, the Supreme Court did not decide whether
the evidence showed undue influence. In that case ~he
facts showed that the testator had five children by a previous marriage. His second wife dictated the terms of a
will to a banker, stating to the banker that the testator
would have to sign the will and that she wouldn't have it
any other way. Then the second wife having died without
the will having been probated, the contest developed
between the heirs of the second wife and the children of
the husband and these facts, the court said, could raise a
suspicion requiring the vigilance of the court.
In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602,
where the decedent was held not to have been acting
under undue influence in making a will disinheriting his
sister and giving his estate to a Catholic School by a will
which he made at the hospital following an operation
for cancer of the stomach from which he died; and although he had never before met the Priest who was at
his side and whom he requested to get assistance in preparing a will, he told the attorney who came to draw the
will that he desired to leave his property to the Catholic
School of which the Priest was supervisor, this Court
under comments 16 and 17, said that the most that can be
said about the influence asserted by Father Kennedy was
that during the few minutes he was alone with the testator,
he, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary, may
have suggested a disposition of the testator's property to
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the school over which he ,presided. The Court then stated
that undue influence must be proved and will not be presumed from mere interest or opportunity; and the opportunity to exercise influence, unless combined wirh
circumstances tending to show its exercise, affords no
presumption that it was in fact exercised.
The case of Jardine vs. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 8 8, 279
P. 2d 454, was a suit by some of the decedent's children
to set aside transfers of property made by an 8 0 year
old woman to her two younger children, who saw her
more often than the other children. The Supreme Court
upheld the finding of the Trial Court that the transfers
were free from fraud and undue influence, even though
the decedent had been suffering from high blood pressure,
hardening of the arteries, headaches, being forgetful at
times and even eccentric, and whereas she made these
transfers at 80 years of age, while prior thereto she carefully avoided making any substantial gifts to anyone.
This Court held that because the Trial Court found as a
matter of fact that the children held a confidential relationship to the decedent, the transaction would have to
be scrutinized; but even so, there was no undue influence
where the recipients of her bounty took her to a Notary
Public to consummate the transfers.
In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372,
where the trial court found that there was undue influence
by a male nurse and masseur who visited and treated the
partially paralyzed testatrix almost daily, and a 50 year
old carpenter who was her boy friend, although she was
almost 60, and where the testatrix made her third will
leaving one-half of her estate to her boy friend and the
other half to the masseur and made no provisions for her
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half-sister who was the beneficiary under previous wills;
this Court reversed the findings of undue influence, on
appeal, stating that undue influence must be proved and
will not be presumed from mere interest or opportunity
and stating that the most that was proved was that the
masseur ((dominated her affairs and overcame her will"
which amounted to no more than mere opportunity colored by respondents' hopeful suspicions. This Court
further said that this was not an unnatural disposition.
The Court under comment (12) stated that:
((Due allowance is made for Mrs. Lavelle's age
and poor physical condition so that her mind
may have been more susceptible to guileful importunings than it otherwise would have been. We
agree that the amount of influence necessary to
overcome the will of the testator varies. . . . But
Mrs. Lavelle was certainly not possessed of a
((child's mind" as was the victim in the Hanson
case. In fact, the testimony shows that she was
wilful even to the point of being cantankerous
with those about her. This and the fact of her
refusal to go to the hospital and the rest home
except upon the use of cajolery and stratagem
demonstrates that she was not as susceptible of
having her will overcome by the influence of others
as respondents suggest."
There was no evidence that James Demiris during his
last illness would cooperate in any matter which was contrary to his desire.
It is respectfully submitted that Mrs. Demiris was
not a confidential adviser to the decedent; that the decedent was capable of relying, and did rely upon his own
judgment and decision; and that each of the transactions,
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of necessity, were done in the presence of third persons
at the respective banks by employees of the banks who
presented the proper cards for signature and made the
transfers on the books and accounts; and in the case of
Mr. Long a document was prepared by Mr. Long carrying out the stated desires of the decedent himself.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE MONEY
IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS AND THE U.S. SAVINGS BONDS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DOCUMENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN
THE CAUSE.
All of the money in the savings accounts were evidenced by written agreements signed by James Demiris
and Iphigenia Demiris, except the trust account in the
American Savings and Loan Association, which will be
dealt with in the cross-appeal, Point I.
The case of Holt vs. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d
715, was the first Utah case to construe joint deposits
where both parties sign joint deposit contracts. The doctrine of the Holt vs. Bayles case is that where there is a
joint agreement executed by the parties which clearly
declares the intention to create a joint interest of each in
the deposit or credit, the court will sustain such intention
thus expressed. Anna Bayles deposited $12,000.00 of her
own money in a joint account with her niece, Emma J.
Bayles. Upon the death of Anna, other nieces of Anna,
claiming under her will, bring suit, de.claring the money to
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belong to the estate of Anna. The Court said the original
ownership of the money or possession of the pass book is
not important, and that where a savings bank deposit is
in joint names and the intent appears to create a joint
tenancy, the survivor takes title to the entire fund irrespective of whether he ever had any possession of the pass
book, or whether the money deposited belonged to the
other; that where both parties went to the bank, deposited
the check and signed a joint deposit contract, the parties
purchased from the bank a credit payable to either of the
joint depositors or to the survivor and each of them had a
present interest in the credit. The Court quoted from 38
Harvard Law Review 244, to the effect that the proper
theory is that when A deposits his money in a joint account
where the depositary promises to pay A or B as joint obligees, and where both A and B sign the agreement of
deposit with the bank, it is clear that the bank makes a
direct promise to B and undertakes an obligation to B
equivalent to that undertaken to A, and in this respect
the transaction becomes, not one of legal gift from A to
B, but the purchase by A for A and B of a contract right
against the bank. The Court distinguishes this case from
all of the previous cases on the ground that there was no
written agreement signed by both of the parties in the
previOus cases.
In brief, the cases decided before Holt vs. Bayles and
cited by the appellant are summarized as follows.
In the case of Holman vs. Deseret Savings Bank, 41
Utah 340, 124 P. 765, the decedent, a married woman,
first had a deposit in the bank in the name of herself and
Eva Z. Dean; when Mrs. Dean died, the decedent presented
the passbook to the cashier of the bank to have the account
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transferred to herself and Mrs. Holman and the entry was
made in the passbook ccin account with Carrie L. Eslinger
or Helen M. Holman." The court held that there was no
evidence of a gift here, and the deposit was not in such
form as to constitute the parties as joint owners. Mrs.
Holman was not a relative of the decedent.
Boyle vs. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136, was a
case in which a mother having eight children, ranging in
ages from 29 to 52, deposited a sum of money in the bank
in her own name and then later went with her two youngest children to the bank to make a further deposit and
asked the cashier to fix the deposits in such a way that if
she died her two younger .children could get the money,
but that she wanted to retain the interest during her lifetim~, whereupon the cashier made the passbook ((Payable
to George T. Pierce or Caroline P. Dinsdale, an equal
amount to each," and then on the bank ledger he made the
entry to read ((Payable to self or George T. Pierce or
Caroline P. Dinsdale, an equal amount to each." The
Court said in this case the mother had created an oral
trust of the account and merely reserved the interest
during her lifetime, and that upon her death the money
was payable to the two children, in equal shares.
In the case of Olson vs. Scott, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987,
Ellen Olson, a widow who had five children, transferred
her savings account to the credit of Ellen Olson and
Olive M. Scott, or to the survivor of either of them. Upon
the death of Ellen, another daughter as administrator
brings suit to recover the money. The trial court found
a gift from Ellen to Olive, and was affirmed by this Court
on appeal in an opinion which distinguished this case from
the Holman case in that in the Holman case, the joint
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depositor was not a relative and there were no words of
survivorship in the entry.
The cases of Lovett vs. Continental Bank, 4 Utah 2d
76, 286 P. 2d 1065, and Jones vs. Cook, 118 Utah 562,
223 P. 2d 423, cited by the appellants deal with the
question of gifts of personal property, being jewelry, and
an automobile, respectively, and are not applicable.
The cases subsequent to Holt vs. Bayles, are:
Neill vs. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327, where
the first wife of Mr. Royce sought one-half of the funds
held by Mr. Royce and his second wife in a joint account
to satisfy support money due the first wife from Mr.
Royce. The second wife claimed that all the money deposited in the account was her own, even though they
had signed a joint tenancy agreement with the bank. The
trial court found that Mr. Royce had an interest in the
savings account and this was affirmed on appeal. This
Court said that the conclusive principal in Holt vs. Bayles, while not controlling in this case, nevertheless there
remains a presumption of joint tenancy where both cotenants are alive, and this presumption, injected by courts
of equity since ancient time, continues and can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
In the case of Greener vs. Greener, 116 Utah 571,
212 P. 2d 194, Mr. Greener at age 79 years, married Mrs.
Greener who was 65 years old. Both parties had raised
families and had been widowed. After they had been
married less than three months, she commenced suit for
divorce, but they were reconciled three months later.
Nine months after that she went to California to visit her
children and while she was away, Mr. Greener withdrew
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from various savings banks the funds which theretofore
existed in the joint names of himself and his wife, and
made a gift to his son. Upon her return from California
Mrs. Greener brought suit for divorce and to claim an
interest in the joint account. The trial court found that
under the circumstances of this case, there was clear and
convincing proof that the intent of the parties was different from that expressed in their joint agreements, and
accordingly found that Mrs. Greener had no interest
in the accounts, for reasons stated in a detailed memorandum of decision. This Court in affirming the trial
court stated that there being a conflict in the evidence as
to the circumstances surrounding the making of the
agreement, the Supreme Court would rely on the trial
judge to resolve the conflicts. This Court, after stating that
in absence of an agreement, and the only documentary
evidence being the form of deposit, A or B, with no
provisions concerning survivorship, the intent of the
owner in converting the account to a joint one must be
shown by extrinsic evidence. But the Court goes on to say:
(( ( 11) Where, however, the parties have entered into and expressed in writing a complete
agreement which is clear as to the intent and purpose of the deposit, the intent so expressed will be
given effect unless the instrument is successfully
attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other
infirmity, or unless it is shown by ((clear and convincing proof" that the parties intended the instrument to have a different effect from that expressed.
Neill vs. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327.

And where one of the co-depositors had died prior
to the assertion of conflicting rights it has bee11
held that there is a conclusive presumption that
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such integrated agreement sets out the complete
intent of the parties. Holt vs. Bayles, 85 Utah 364,
39 P. 2d 715. The reason for the conclusive presumption, in the absence of statute, may not be
clear for seemingly death would have no effect on
the intent with which the joint deposit was created.
However, since both of the parties in the instant
case are still alive, we need not concern ourselves
with the reasoning employed to support the conclusive presumption of intent where one of the
parties has died before the assertion of conflicting
rights." (Emphasis added) .
In the case of First Security Bank of Utah vs. Burgi,
122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 297, where a father had an account in the bank in the name of ((Burgi Grocery and Meat,
Fred Burgi." and later signed the card with his son, Clyde,
authorizing the bank to treat them as joint depositors but
which card did not change or mention the name of the
account to be so treated, this Court held that there was
no joint acount because of the failure to designate an
account, but reaffirmed the holding of Holt vs. Bayles.
This Court held in comment seven and eight as follows:
(7 & 8) It is true where an intention to
create a joint account is clearly expressed in a written contract executed by the parties, which remains unaltered, and there is no evidence of fraud,
undue influence, mistake, or other infirmity, the
question of intention ceases to be in issue and the
courts are bound by the agreement. Holt vs. Bayles,
85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 715, and cases cited therein.
Likewise it is true that the fact that all the funds
are contributed by one of the parties will not prevent the creation of a joint tenancy in the account
if all the essentials for the creation of such an estt
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tate exist. Holt vs. Bayles, supra; 48 C. J. S. Joint
Tenancy, 3 (e) ( 4), page 925."
The appellants on page 52 and 53 of their brief cite
Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, and
imply that the holding of this case would preclude survivorship as to all funds withdrawn during the lifetime of
of the owner. However, both the appellants and the
quoted citation in A.L.R. misinterpret the holding of
Moskowitz v. Marrow. Chief Justice Cardozo who wrote
a concuring opinion in the case of Moskowitz v. Marrow,
wrote the opinion in a sequel case, Marrow v. Moskowitz,
et al., 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460, and ~tated that since
there was some confusion as to the effect of the ruling in
the case of Moskowitz v. Marrow, he would state it again
in this case of Marrow v. Moskowitz, that the withdrawal
of the money did not destroy the joint tenancy or the
title of the survivor, if a joint tenancy had been created,
but it does open the door to competent evidence that the
tenancy created at the opening of the account was in
truth something different from joint tenancy. The opinion in Marrow v. Moskowitz is not lengthy and because of
its importance, is set forth there in its entirety:
CARDOZO, C. J.
Defendants' testatrix, Fannie Manheimer,
opened an account in the Yorkville Bank of New
York City on October 3, 1923, in the name of
((Pearl Harris or Fannie Manheimer, payable to
either or survivor." Banking Law, Consol. Laws,
c. 2249-, subd. 3.
On January 19, 1925, she closed the account
by withdrawing the entire fund and depositing it
in a new account opened in her own name.
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This action is brought by Pearl Harris, now
Pearl Harris Marrow, against the executors of Mrs.
Manheimer to establish as to the joint account a
title by survivorship, and to recover to her own use
the moneys withdrawn therefrom.
This court in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y.
3 80, 167 N.E. 506, 66. A.L.R. 870 determined the
interests of the same parties in other bank accounts
opened in a like form. The opinions as the Appellate Division suggest some confusion of thought
as to the effect of our ruling, and hence for greater
certainty we state it again.
( 1, 2) When a bank account is opened in the
form prescribed by statute (Banking Law 249,
subd. 3), a presumption at once arises that the
interest of the depositors is that of joint tenants.
Upon the death of one of the despositors, this presumption becomes conclusive in favor of the survivor in respect of any moneys then left in the
account. It continues to be a mere presumption in
respect of any moneys previously withdrawn.
( 3) The moneys now in controversy were no
longer in the account at the death of Mrs. Manheimer. They had been taken out during her life.
The withdrawal did not destroy the joint tenancy
or the title of the survivors, if a joint tenancy had
been ·Created. It did, however, open the door to
competent evidence, if any was available, that the
tenancy created at the opening of the account was
in truth something different from the tenancy defined by the presumption. It had no other force.

( 4) The defendants offered evidence in an attempt to neutralize the presumption, but what
was offered was properly rejected as being incompetent against the plaintiff. The evidence consisted of statements made by Mrs. Manheimer to
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nurses and others in the absence of the plaintiff
after the account had been established. Such heresay declarations were unavailing to divest a title,
or to shatter the presumption that a title was intended. Moskowitz v. Marrow, supra, at page 400
of 251 N. Y., 167 N.E. 506; Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N.Y. 433, 434, 435, 88 N.E. 750; Mabie
v. Bailey, 95 N.Y. 206. 211.
The fact that Mrs. Manheimer was blind and
helpless would indeed have been corroborating circumstance if evidence had been offered that by
the agreement of the depositors the tenancy in its
inception did not accord with the presumption. In
the absence of other evidence, her disabilities were
without significance. A corroborating circumstance is worthless when there is nothing to corroborate.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
POUND, CRANE, LEHMAN, KELLOGG,
Judgment affirmed.
O'BRIEN, and HUBBS, JJ., concur.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF JOINT TENANCY CREATED
BY THE AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES IN ESTABLISHING THE JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS.
The appellants list under their Point IV (App. Br. 5455), their interpretation of evidence which they construed
to rebut a presumption of gift. However, from the cases
previously reviewed the problem is not confined to a question of gift, but involves a question of whether there was
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an intention to create a survivorship or joint tenancy relationship. There was no evidence that the decedent at
the time of making the accounts or thereafter did not
intend that his wife become a joint tenant therein.
We answer the ten items of evidence listed by appellants on pages 54 and 55 of their brief numerically as follows:
1. The appellants fail to mention the will of December 30, 1947, wherein Jim left $1,000.00 to each of his
two brothers and one sister in Greece and left nothing at
all to his brothers John and Peter in Salt Lake City after
a life-time association with them (Exhibit D-7, R. 392).
2. Mrs. Demiris was the natural recipient of his

bounty as set forth in detail in our argument on Point II
(supra p. 34) showing the many savings bonds and
accounts placed in joint tenancy between September 1943
and March 12, 1956. They were separated only 11 out of
31 years, and this separation was with the full consent and
approval of Jim, and was prolonged by reason of war and
not by the desire of the parties. The only item of dispute
mentioned by appellants' witnesses was that the defendant
wanted Jim to go back to Greece to live with her during
their retirement, and Jim did not want to go, according
to the appellants' witnesses, even though he had a sick sister and two brothers still in Greece. There was no evidence
that Jim found any other fault with his wife.
3. Mrs. Demiris had no occasion to draw any money
from the accounts, since although he was tttight" he usually gave her what she wanted within the limits of his conservative disposition (R. 169). Whether she drew on the
accounts or not is immaterial.
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4. Mrs. Demiris withdrew the money after her husband was hospitalized for the stated reason that she was
acting in accordance with the instructions of her husband
(R. 179 and 112); that the money was hers (R. 112);
and that the bank told her that any time she wanted to
draw the money out she could (R. 114).
5. Mrs. Demiris testified that she was mistaken as to
the time the bonds had been cashed, and she testified in
her deposition that she couldn't remember when they were
cashed (R. 106).
6. Mr. Long said that Mr. Demiris wanted his wife's
name on the check that was mailed out to him, because he
would like her to be able to cash the check in case he was
~~sick or something" she could cash it and have some money
(R. 32 3) , and that he wanted her to be able to cash it
alone (R. 325).
7. Mrs. Demas said that on the 6th or 7th of December, Jim told her that he had drawn the books and the
money to his wife and then Mrs. Demas herself stated that
she thought that was a good idea, because if he got sick
his wife would look after him; but this was not the statement of Mr. Demiris (R. 388). There was no such statement, as inferred by appellant, that the reason Mr. Demiris put the money in her hame was just to provide money
in case of sickness.
8. Mrs. Demiris could not remember talking with
anybody about drawing money out of an account that had
Jim's name only on it (R. 104) . If Alke Diamant had
discussed joint tenancy with Mrs. Demiris as he said he
did between August 1955 and April 1956 (R. 221-222),
it is not likely that Mrs. Demiris would be making inquiry
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from a tenant in the Oakwood apartments about a matter
which she had already been told by an attorney.
9. A witness who testified relative to the incident
where Jim and his wife were having a discussion in front
of the Western Union Building, said at (R. 228) that he
thinks they were talking about going on a trip or something. Thus, under circumstances where Mrs. Demiris
was trying to get Jim to take a vacation with her, and
spend some of the money while he was alive, rather than
leave it all to her after he died, really indicated that they
had both discussed and agreed that she would get all of his
money upon his death, and what she wanted him to do
was to spend a little while he was living (R. 227).
10. Mr. Demiris had spent a lifetime protecting his
money from everyone. There was no evidence that he was
ever generous with his brothers or sister and as recently as
November 1956, was only sending his sick sister about
$15.00 per month. He never showed any generosity toward his brothers and sister.

POINT V
THE TWO DEPOSIT CARDS IN THE CONTINENTAL BANK CREATED A JOINT TENANCY
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The appellants. under Point V, page 57 of their brief
set forth the language on the cards signed at Continental
Bank. These accounts are Exhibits P-12 and P-13. In
addition to the printed material on said cards as quoted by
the appellants, there was stamped on the signature card,
of P-12 and on the ledger card of P-13, and on the bank
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books themselves, the following phrase: ((This account
is payable to the order of either of the depositors or to the
order of the survivor."
This question that these cards did not create a joint
tenancy was raised for the first time by the appellants on
appeal. In the pretrial order (R. 37 and 38) all of the
accounts were treated as joint accounts and no distinction
was made between the accounts with Continental Bank
and other banks. All of the complaints, including the
Third Amended Complaint of the appellants, stated at
least in the first .cause of action that the accounts with
Continental Bank were in joint tenancy.
The words of survivorship used in these cards is sufficient to create a joint tenancy. In the case of Neill vs.
Royce, supra, in reviewing the history of joint tenancy,
the Court quoted the stautory provision in the Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933, relative to grants to two or more
persons in their own right being tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in the grant to be otherwise, and
the Court further stated as follows:
HHowever, at all times where an expressed
intention appeared on the face of the instrument
indicating a joint tenancy, equity would allow the
joint tenancy to prevail. In Hayes v. Kingdome,
1 Vern. 33, 23 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 288, where it
appeared that cotenants contracted among themselves for a survivorship of their interests, equity
gave force to their agreement by holding that they
held as joint tenants."
In 1953, by special amendment the Utah Legislature
provided as follows:
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((U.C.A. 57-1-5. GRANT TO TWO OR
MORE - TENANCY IN COMMON PRESUMED-JOINT TENANCY-CREATION OF
JOINT TENANCY IN OWNER AND OTHERS
-INTEREST OF JOINT TENANTS.-Every
interest in real estate granted to two or more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in the grant to be
otherwise. Use of words ((joint tenancy" or ((with
rights of survivorship" or ((and to the survivor of
them" or words of similar import shall declare a
joint tenancy. A sole owner of real property shall
create a joint tenancy in himself and another or
others by making a transfer to himself and such
other or others as joint tenants by use of such words
as herein provided or by conveying to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest in land in which an interest is retained by
the grantor and by declaring the creation of a
joint tenancy by use of such words as herein provided. In all cases the interest of joint tenants must
be equal and undivided."
In the case of Columbia Trust Co. vs. Anglum, 63
Utah 354, 255 P. 1089, where the account was in the name
of William J. or Mrs. William J. Anglum, husband and
wife, the Court held that a joint ownership with the right
of survivorship was created even without the use of the
words survivorship. The Court quoted from R.C.L. page
527 as follows:
ult is well established that a bank account may
be so fixed that two persons shall be joint owners
thereof during their mutual lives, and the survivor
take the whole on the death of the other. In creating a joint bank account with right of survivorship, it is a matter of no importance that the
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particular terms tjoint ownership' and tjoint account' are not used; the controlling question is
whether the person opening the account intentionally and intelligently created a condition embracing the essential elements of joint ownership
and survivorship. No particular formula is required, and courts will be controlled by the substance of the transaction rather than by the name
given it."
As stated by Justice Cordozo in his concurring opinion in Moskowitz v. Marrow, a layman would be more inclined to understand the effect of a phrase which makes
the account payable to either or the survivor than he would
a statement that they were creating a joint tenancy. There
can be little doubt that Mr. Demiris intended to create a
joint tenancy in this case as he did in the others. He was
required to sign a card which was presented to him by the
bank as its own form to accomplish this purpose.

POINT VI
.THE FIN;QING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE WITHDRAWALS BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE DE(:EDENT DID NOT
TERMINATE THE JOINT TENANCY IS SUPPORTED BY BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
The Steinmetz case cited by the appellants to support
their contention that withdrawal of the funds prior to the
death of James Demiris caused a severance, stands almost
alone in the cases which have considered this point, and even
in New Jersey, subsequent cases explain the narrow ground
upon which the Steinmetz case was decided.
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In 48 C.J.S. 929, it states that withdrawal of funds
during the lifetime of both, by one joint tenant, either (a)
creates a joint tenancy in the funds or property purchased
with the funds, or (b) , gives property to withdrawer as
his own.
The New York decisions as stated in Marrow vs.
Moskowitz which is set forth in its entirety, (supra)
hold that the withdrawal of moneys merely opens the door
to competent evidence that the tenancy created at the
opening of the account was in truth something different
from joint tenancy. Two subsequent New York cases, In
Re Daranshinkey's Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 289, and Matter
of Poranda 256 N.Y. 426, 176 N.E. 826, state the New
York rule to be as follows:
ttThe withdrawal of moneys from joint account does not destroy the joint tenancy if one was
created; it merely opens the door to competent
evidence, if available, that no joint tenancy was
originally intended or created."
The New York decisions are followed by the state of
Oregon. In the case of State vs. Gralewski's estate, 176 Or.
448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945), where John (father) placed
money in joint accounts with Kirk (son). The father
becomes incompetent. Son becomes ill and while ill draws
all the money and disposes of it by will and dies before his
father dies. Later the father dies and the State Land Board
claims the funds by escheat in absence of heirs. The main
question was whether the father, as survivor, was entitled
to the funds which had been previously withdrawn by
the son. The Oregon Court after reviewing many cases,
held that they preferred the basis of decision of the New
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York Courts and held in this .case there was no severance
of the joint tenancy, but only results in a change of form,
and the rights of the respective parties remain unaltered.
The Court also held that recitals in the signature cards that
the property is payable to either or the survivor was suffi.cent to create a joint account with the right of survivorship which it dealt with as a joint tenancy.
The California Courts as stated in Doran vs. Hibernia
Savings and Loan Soc., 80 Cal. App. 2d 790, 182 P.2d 630,
hold as follows:
(2, 3) In the case of a bank account it is
settled in this state that even the destruction of
the unity of title does not terminate the joint tenancy."
The opinion cites many other California cases which
establish the principle in California that if money is taken
from a joint tenancy account during the joint lives of the
depositors, property acquired by the money so withdrawn,
or another account into which the money is traced, will
retain its character as property held in joint tenancy like
the original fund, unless there has been a change in character by some agreement between the parties.
tt

In view of the appellants' reliance on the Steinmetz
case we will now summarize the facts and holdings of the
New Jersey Courts in the Steinmetz case and two subsequent cases.
(I.) In Steinmetz vs. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 176,
21 A2d 743, New Jersey (1941) the opinion was rendered
by one Vice Chancellor. The case was a con test between
the son of the decedent and the second wife of decedent
arising when said wife withdrew the entire amounts in
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two joint savings accounts which were in her name and the
decedent's name, and redeposited said money in two new
accounts in the name of herself and another woman. The
withdrawal was made at a time when decedent was committed to a mental institution. The Court based its decision that the withdrawal severed the joint tenancy on two
The wife's action was an inequitable atreasons: ( 1)
tempt to deprive him of all interest therein, and (2) the
four unities of interest, title, time, and possession must
continue to exist in joint tenancy and she severed the unity
of interest and possession.
(2.) In the case of Stiles vs. Newchwander et al. 49
A. 2d 572, (New Jersey 1946) the opinion was rendered
by one Vice Chancellor. Miss N ewschwander had lived
for 3 0 years with her brother Albert and wife. On December 1, 1941, she asked the bank to add the name of her
brother to her account, making the same payable to either
or the survivor, which was done. On September 26, 1944,
she suffered a stroke from which she never recovered. On
the same day Albert caused the money on deposit, $3500.00, to be transfered to an account in his own name, and
five weeks later he added the name of his wife to the account. Then Miss Newschwander died February 5, 1945,
at the age of 68 years. The administrator of her estate sued
to impose a trust upon Albert in favor of the estate. The
Court in holding that Albert could keep all the funds for
himself, distinguished this case from the Steinmetz case
by saying that the Steinmetz case found fraud and an inequitable attempt by one co-tenant to deprive another.
However, Albert had no intention of depriving his sister
and recognized the trust during her lifetime, and knew he
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must provide for her living and care. The Court held that
if Albert had died his sister would have survived to all, and
whether the wife or his administrator would have acknowledged Miss Newschwander's right cccannot be known."
((But nothing in this case justifies a finding that Albert
schemed to defraud his sister of her right of survivorship or
any other right. Fraud is not presumed." (emphasis added). The Court said further that there was no equitable
basis for charging Albert's title with any trust beyond the
one he recognized and that the Steinmetz case did not
apply. This case necessarily holds that there is no severance
by withdrawal.
(3.) The next New Jersey .case is that of Bremus vs.
Forsatz, 5 New Jersey Superior 435, 69 A2d 557 (1949),
a case wherein three judges participate in the decision.
Tessie married Martin Bremus in 19 3 3. A savings account
was opened in a bank in the names of Tessie or Martin
Bremus, cceither or the survivor to draw" and the funds
deposited belonged to Martin. On October 29, 1945,
Tessie withdrew the balance of $1,767.81 and died in 1947,
testate, leaving Martin $5.00 and all the rest to her sons by
a previous marriage, John and Emil Forsatz. The lower
Court held that when Tessie withdrew all, she converted
the fund and severed the joint tenancy and thereby became trustee of the other one-half. This was reversed on
appeal, the court saying this case differs from the Steinmetz
case in that in the Steinmetz case cca new account was
opened in a form which was demonstrative of a derogation
of the right to possession of the one suing to recover and
was therefore a conversion.
A review of even the New Jersey cases shows that
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there is no severance by withdrawal from the joint savings
account. In the instant case, Mrs. Demiris withdrew the
funds pursuant to instructions from her husband, remained
with him and cared for him during his illness and until
his death, and in no way handled the funds in any manner
which would be in derogation of the rights of James
Demiris had he been restored to capacity prior to his death.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS BY WAY OF CROSS
APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE
NAME OF JAMES DEMIRIS TRUSTEE FOR IPHIGENIA DEMIRIS FOR $1 o,ono.oo, FAILED FO'R
WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT AND FAILED TO
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON, IN THAT
THE INSTRUMENT CREATING THE TRUST ITSELF PROVIDED FOR THE PAYMENT TO THE
BENEFICIARY IRRESPECTIVE OF DONATIVE INTENT OR THE CREATION OF SPECIAL TENANCIES OTHER THAN THE TRUST ITSELF. ACCORDINGLY THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS UPON SAID
TRUST ACCOUNT.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT IN
THAT THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY
JAMES DEMIRIS CONSITUTED THE DEFENDANT,
EITHER A JOINT TENANT OR AT LEAST A TENANT IN COMMON OF THE BALANCE DUE JAMES
DEMIRIS ON THE ELMER BUTLER ACCOUNT.
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ARGUMENT BY WAY OF CROSS
APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE
NAME OF JAMES DEMIRIS TRUSTEE FOR IPHIGENIA DEMIRIS FOR $10,000.00, FAILED FOR
WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT AND FAILED TO
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON, IN THAT
THE INSTRUMENT CREATING THE TRUST ITSELF PROVIDED FOR THE PAYMENT TO THE
BENEFICIARY IRRESPECTIVE OF DONATIVE INTENT OR THE CREATION OF SPECIAL TENANCIES OTHER THAN THE TRUST ITSELF. ACCORDINGLY THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO· THE PLAINTIFFS UPON SAID
TRUST ACCOUNT.
On about September 13, 1949, the decedent, James
Demiris, opened an account with the American Savings
and Loan Association, Account No. 0-6635 with a deposit
of $4,637.44. He made regular deposits to said account,
until the account was built up to about $10,000.00. On
December 5, 19 56, the decedent changed said account
from his own name to an account in the name of James
Demiris, Trustee for lphigenia Demiris, his wife, beneficiary, under the same Account No. 0-6635. At the
time of changing the designation of the account, the decedent signed a card provided by the American Savings
and Loan Association (Exhibit P-16). The face of the card
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shows James Demiris, Trustee, Account No. 0-6635 for
lphigenia Demiris, his wife, beneficiary, and recites an
application for an optional savings account in the
American Savings and Loan Association, and in addition
to some incidental recitals on the face of the card, shows
the signature of James Demiris, P. 0. Box 1432, Salt
Lake City, ((As Trustee for the above named beneficiary.'"'
There is a notation at the bottom of the card, in parentheses ((See reverse side of card for Trust Agreement" and
a further notation ((Discretionary, revocable trust account."
The reverse side of the card provides in substance that
in the event of the trustee's death, the Association could
appoint a successor trustee and that the funds should
ultimately be paid to the named beneficiary.
The American Savings and Loan Asociation paid to
lphigenia Demiris the $10,000.00 on February 19, 1957,
pursuant to the provisions of the Trust (Exhibit P-16).
Trusts of savings accounts have received special
treatment by the Courts and have been generally termed
((Totten Trust," following the decision of the Court of
Appeals of New York In Re Totten (1904') 179 N. Y.
112, 71 N. E. 748, in which the Court established the
following doctrine:
((A deposit by one person of his own money
in his ·own name as trustee for another, standing
alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative
trust, merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some
unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In
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case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on
hand at the death of the depositor."
Volume One, Scott on Trust Section 58.3, states
the following:
((There are numerous decisions in New York
in which the doctrine of Matter of Totten has
been followed and applied, and the beneficiary has
been held entitled to the amount on deposit at the
death of the depositor. There are decisions in other
states in which tentative trusts of savings bank
deposits have been upheld." The text then cites
cases in California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.
The Restatement of the Law of Trust, Section 58,
states under caption ({Tentative Trust of Savings Deposits"
as follows:
uwhere a person makes a deposit in a savings
account in a bank in his own name as trustee for
another person intending to reserve a power to
withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at
any time during his lifetime, and to use as his own,
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise to revoke
the trust, the intended trust is enforcable by the
beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to
any part remaining on deposit on his death, if he
has not revoked the trust."
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of
Cohen vs. Newton Savings Bank 67 N. E. 2d 748, 750; 320
Mass 90, 168 A.L.R. 1321, reversed the trial court and
enforced the trust in a case where an elderly gentleman
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opened an account in his name in trust for his secretary.
The decedent had signed a card, on the back of which,
contained the following: ((This account I hold in trust
to control and dispose of as I see fit during my lifetime,
but on my death to pay to the beneficiary the full amount
standing to the credit of this account. Lewis 0. Loche."
He made many deposits and withdrawals; the secretary
never knew of the account until after his death. The
trial court found that the secretary never received the
pass book, never had knowledge of the account until after
death, that the testator intended to control and did control the account during his lifetime, and that ((As a fact
that the testator did not intend to create a present interest
in the account with the respondent Ernst." The Supreme
Court held that though the findings of the lower court
may be proper in other respects, it was ((plainly wrong"
about the finding relative to lack of intention to create a
trust. The Supreme Court held that this case differs from
a situation where there is a deposit in the name of one
person as trustee for another, without more. (tin the present case, however, the declaration of trust is in writing
and was signed by the testator. Its terms are expressly set
out." The case was reversed with directions to honor the
trust.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in the matter of
the estate of Morris A. Madsen, 296 P. 2d 518, 48 Wash.
2d 675, followed the rule stated by the Restatement of the
Law of Trust and the Totten Case in reversing the trial
court in a case where the signature card signed by the
decedent, provided as follows:
((Funds in this account consitute a voluntary
trust for Mamie Madsen revocable by me in whole
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or. in part, at any time, by the withdrawal of funds.
After my death, funds remaining in the account
shall belong to the beneficiary absolutely. Both the
beneficiary and myself shall be bound by the ByLaws and other regulations of the Washington
Mutual Savings Bank. (Signed) Morris Madsen."
The Court went on to say:
((In the instant case, there is no problem of the
sufficiency of proof of intention. The written
declaration of trust (quoted supra) is full and
explicit, clear, unambiguous. It specifically identifies decedent's intention to establish a revocable
trust for the beneficiary.
There is no evidence to the contrary."
((We conclude that the written declaration of
trust in the present case is sufficient to establish a
valid trust for the benefit of the beneficiary named,
the appellant, and that she is entitled to the funds
involved."
In the case of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, supra, This Court
found an oral trust in a deposit in a bank wherein the
entry was made upayable to George T. Pierce or Carolyn
P. Dinsdale, and equal amount to each," being the children
of the decedent. The trust was valid even though the decedent retained the passbook and retained the right to
the interest during her lifetime. This Utah case would
seem to prove the principle of the Totten Trust.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT IN
THAT THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY
JAMES DEMIRIS CONSTITUTED THE DEFENDSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ANT EITHER A JOINT TENANT OR AT LEAST
A TENANT IN COMMON OF THE BALANCE DUE
JAMES DEMIRIS ON THE ELMER BUTLER ACCOUNT.
The Trust department of the First Security Bank of
Utah, 4th South Branch, had in its possession a note in
the original principal sum of $54,300.00, payable to
James Demiris and executed by Elmer and Minerva Butler.
On December 23, 1949, the decedent signed a letter addressed to First Security Bank of Utah N.A., Exchange
Place Branch, Attention Trust Department, which was
signed and a.ccepted by Ralph D. Cowan, Trust Officer,
wherein the decedent deposited in trust the said note,
mortgage, abstract, release of note and mortgage, and instructed the Bank to collect what was due under the note
and to pay:
2741400 to James Demiris
63/400 to Peter Demiris
63 I 400 to John Demiris

The Bank made collections under said note and distributed
the same in accordance with the foregoing proportions
until the death of the decedent, at which time the balance
due upon said note was the total sum of $23,832.00, and
the proportion belonging to the decedent was $16,77 4.21.
On December 10, 1956, the decedent and the defendant went to the First Security Bank, at the 4th South
Branch, Trust Department. The decedent talked with
Mr. Floyd R~ Long in the Trust Department, and stated
that he desired his wife's name to be put on the check in
case he should get sick or something she could have money.
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Whereupon, Mr. Floyd R. Long prepared the following document which was signed by the decedent and the
defendant:
First Security Bank of Utah N.A.
Trust Dept., Fourth South Branch
Salt Lake City, Utah
Gentlemen:
With respect to the account you are collecting
from Mr. Elmer Butler, we the undersigned, hereby
express our desire to have the portion heretofore
sent to Mr. James Demiris, made out to the below
named individuals:
James Demiris
or
I phigenia Demiris

sl

James Demiris

James Demiris
s/Iphigenia Demiris
I phigenia Demiris
Mr. Cowan testified that he is Trust Officer of the
First Security Bank of Utah, and that in December,
1949, the promissory note from Mr. and Mrs. Butler
payable to James Demiris was placed with the First Security Bank for collection pursuant to instructions contained in Exhibit P-1 (R. 404). He said the Bank was
in possession of the note and mortgage and were making
collection and distributing to James, Peter and John in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

------=-------~-

--.--------------

73

accordance with their ownership in the property which
was sold, and in the note. After the death of James Demiris they continued to make collections as before and
have maintained only one file and one account, and the
only change since the death of James Demiris was that
the remittance of the James Demiris portion was retained
by the executor (R. 405).
Under the foregoing circumstances Mr. Demiris
could not obtain possession of the note for the purpose of
endorsing it over to his wife and apparently any dealing
he would make with respect to the note would have to be
by separate instrument. It would appear that Exhibit D-20
prepared by Mr. Long on December 10, 1956, with instructions that if Mr. Demiris should get sick or something,
he wanted his wife to have the money, the said exhibit
D-20 accomplished passing title to Mrs. Demiris under one
or more of the following theories:
(1.) Under the theory of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, supra,
the bank became the Trustee to make payment in accordance with the instructions and upon the death of James
Demiris was required to continue to make payments to
Mrs. Demiris.
(2.) Under the theory of Columbia Trust Company
vs. Anglum, supra, where the deposit in the name of H.
or W., they being husband and wife, established joint
ownership with the right of survivorship, the intention
being controlling; where Mr. Demiris said if he should
get sick or something, he wanted his wife to have the
money, it would seem to be an undue limitation on his
intention to say that under the circumstances he only
intended for her to get the money so long as he was sick,
but not if he passed away.
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(3.) In the case of Thatcher vs. Merriam, 121 Utah
191, 240 P. 2d 266, the decedent made an assignment, in
consideration of love and affection, to his three sisters of
a certain note, mortgage and chattel mortgage, and retained the possession of the note, mortgage and chattel
mortgage and received the payments during his lifetime.
The note was for $70,000.00 and the heirs brought suit
to have the assignment declared void for reasons that the
decedent retained control of the note, and that he did
not endorse the note, which they contended made the
assignment inoperative. This Court held the assignment
valid, saying that there was no necessity for complying
with the formal requirements of a will; that an assignment of the note and mortgage can be made though the
assignor retains possession until his death; that an assignment of a note may be formal or informal and may be by
separate instrument or even by parol, whether the assignment is made by way of gift or for consideration; and
that where a maker retains possession of the note with the
intent to hold it for the benefit and as agent of the payee,
there is constructive delivery of the note.
Mr. Long testified that he made just an original of
Exhibit D-20 and that he retained the original (R. 326327). Under the doctrine of the Thatcher case, Mr.
Demiris made a valid assignment or negotiation of his
interest in the note under the circumstances of retention
of the note and mortgage by the bank for purposes of collection for James, John and Peter Demiris. If Mr. Demiris
did not intend that she have the funds after his death it
would seem that he would have placed such a specific
limitation in his request to Mr. Long for the preparation
of Exhibit D-20.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be modified by reversing the judgment
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
upon the Trust Account No. 0-6635 with American
Savings and Loan Association and by awarding judgment
to the defendant upon her counter-claim for the portion
of the Elmer Butler note, which belonged to James
Demiris and which was being collected by First Security
Bank.

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY, and NEBEKER
THORNLEY K. SWAN
GEORGE K. FADEL
Attorneys for the Respondent and
Cross Appellant
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(insert following page 53, Respondent's
Brief)

NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES
PROPOSITION:

U. S. SAVINGS BONDS REGISTERED IN NAME OF TWO PERSONS IN THE ALTERNATIVE
BECOME THE PROPERTY OF THE
SURVIVOR OR ONE FIRST PRESENTING THEM FOR PAYMENT.

The Court is respectfully requested,
pursuant to provisions of Sec. 78-25-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, to take Judicial notice of United States Treasury
Department Regulations, Department Circular No. 530, which are codified as
Part 315 of Code of Federal Regulations.
Section 315.60 provides in part as
follows:
"Sec. 315.60. During the lives of
both coowners.---A sav1ngs bond registered in coownership form, for example,
"John A. Jones or Mrs. Mary C. Jones,"
will be paid or reissued during the
lives of both, as follows:
(a) PAYMENT.--The bond will be paid
to either upon his separate request, and
upon payment to him the other shall cease
to have any interest in the bond. If
both request payment jointly, payment
will be made by check drawn to their
order iointly, for example, "John A.
Jones
AND Mrs. Mary C. Jones."
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Section 315.61 provides as follows:
"Sece 315.61. AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE
OR BOTH COOWNERS.--If either coowner dies
without the bond having been presented and
surrendered for payment or authorised reissue, the survivor will be recognized
as the sole and absolute ovner. Thereafter, payment or reissue will be made as
though the bond were registered in the
name of the surTivor alone (see Subpart
K), except that a request for reissue by
him must be supported by proof of death
of the other coowner, and except further
that after the death of the eurTivor proof
of death of both coowners and of the order
in which they died will be required. The
presentation and surrender of a bond by
one coowner for payment establishes his
right to receive the proceeds of the bond,
and if he ~hould die before the transaction is completed, payment will be made
to the legal representative of, or persons
entitled to, his estate in accordanee with
the provisions of Subpart N. If either
coowner dies after the bond has been
presented and surrendered for authorized
reissue {see Sec. 315.47), the bond will
be regarded as though reissued during his
lifetime."

The United States Savings Bonds were
Contracts between the United States and
the named coowners and the federal law ·
must govern the meaning of the bonds and
the rights thereto, and no state law can
vary the terms of federal obligations.
Treasury Regulations being enacted pursuant
to Congressional Act, become the law of the
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Connell vQ Bauer, 240 Minne 280,

61 NW 2d 177, 40 ALR 2d, 776c
2d

It is further stated in 37 ALR
at 1229~ as follows:

1221~

•1

4~-~BASES

(a)

FOR MAJORITY VIEWc

Treasury

Ragttl~ltions

as part

of contract ..
The principal basis for the majority
viev is that Bolution of the question as
to the property rights of the surTiving
co=owner is not one of gift but of contractp and that Treasury Regulations~
having the force and effect of federal
law!) become a part of,the bonds as a
corrcra.ct between the fiUrchaser and the
f~deral gov~rnment, and are determinative
of the property rights of the parties to
the bondso"
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